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The Soldier and the State in South Korea: 





This study assess the extent of democratic civilian control of the military in South Korea by 
examining civilianization of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and parliamentary oversight over 
the military focusing on the role of the National Defense Committee (NDC). The MND and the NDC 
are key actors in civil-military relations; nevertheless, little attention is paid to the role of these 
institutions in improving democratic consolidation. This research found that although civilian 
governments in South Korea had successfully implemented parliamentary control of the military in 
terms of preventing the military from politics in the process of democratic transitions and consolidation, 
they had less success in establishing democratic civilian control of the MND. This is due largely to the 
ongoing high security threat in the Korean peninsula. Facing North Korean threat, the military is not 
ready to accept true civilians as its top leaders on the premise that civilians may not be able to perform 
the significant roles of minister and vice minister effectively because they do not have full experience 
and professional knowledge about the military. As a result, the MND retains a significant institutional 
autonomy in the top leadership. The research argues that civilianizing the top leadership of the MND 
will be one of the most important steps for South Korea to go toward deepening democratic civil-
military relations in the new era of integration.  
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After the establishment of the First Republic in 1948, South Korean politics were 
dominated by authoritarian and military regimes for nearly four decades. During that period, 
the military not only played a major role in domestic politics, but also overwhelmed civilian 
counterparts in terms of political power. The military regimes allowed the armed forces to 
enjoy economic and political prerogatives in order to maintain domestic political stability 
and the loyalty of the army. Since democratic transition in the late 1980s, however, the role 
of the military in South Korean politics has been reduced severely. The military returned to 
barracks and was excluded from politics. Its role was limited to national defense against an 
external threat. Indeed, the military in South Korea no longer appears to be a key player in 
domestic politics. 
The divided nationhood has been considered as a major obstacle to the further democratic 
consolidation in South Korea. The threat from North Korea has been a constant factor in 
South Korean politics and foreign relations. The South Korean military intervened in 
domestic politics in the name of national security. Under the national security concern, the 
South Korean military enjoyed autonomy and legitimized its involvement in politics, while 
the democratic leaders could not reject the enhanced role of the army. In particular, the 
national security problem in the Korean peninsula inhibited the democratic force from 
enhancing the institutionalization of democratic civilian control of the defense and security 
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sector in the wake of democratic transition. Consequently, the problem has retarded 
democratic consolidation in South Korea.  
It is true that South Korea has accomplished remarkable achievements including 
increasing individual political rights and civil liberties, the freedom of speech, and the 
consolidation of electoral democracy. In spite of this democratic progress, it is too early to 
conclude that South Korea has achieved a consolidated democracy. What elements should 
improve for further progress toward democratic consolidation in South Korea? One of the 
most important foundations for democratic consolidation is establishing a solid democratic 
civilian control of the military. South Korea has made an effort to reform civilian control of 
the armed force following the democratic transition that only focused on preventing the 
military’s involvement in domestic politics. Although the threat of praetorian military 
intervention in domestic politics has plummeted, civil-military relations in South Korea are 
now facing a new challenge that should be resolved to enhance the quality of democracy. 
This challenge is to craft democratic civilian control of the military (Saxer, 2004: 403; 
Cottey et al., 2002: 31-56).
1
  
The main goal of this article is to assess the degree of democratic civilian control of the 
military in South Korea. To do so, this article reviews literatures on civilian control of the 
military and discusses the main thesis of this study. This paper then assesses the extent of 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces by examining civilian supremacy in the 
Ministry of National Defense (MND) and parliamentary oversight of the military. This 
article concludes with a discussion of the major findings and evaluation. 
 
 
2. WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS AND HOW? 
 
The military is a group for managing violence (Lasswell, 1941: 455-468) to defend a 
nation against external and internal threats and is considered one of the indispensable 
elements for the establishment of a state. When the military interests are more internal rather 
than external, the military becomes a politicized group and a major political force. Once 
armed forces become involved in domestic politics, it is hard for them to disengage from 
politics due to an absence of military professionalism and a strong willingness to continue 
their privileges. For this reason, the politicized military is assumed as a big threat to a 
democratic norm and system. Thus, most literature on civil-military relations stresses that the 
political role and power of military should be minimized as much as it possibly can. In spite 
of the significant role of military in a country, the armed forces appear to be ‘a necessary 
evil’ in democracies. If the armed forces have more political power than civilian counterparts, 
democratic principles would be undermined and thus result in the emergence of different 
political governing systems such as authoritarian, totalitarian, and sultanistic regimes.
2
 As a 
result, ensuring democratic civilian control of the military becomes the primary principle of 
civil-military relations in advanced democracies. In line with this principle, much of the 
academic literature on civil-military relations has sought a general theory to explain what 
                                                          
1 In the same context, a study argues that building effective civilian control of the defense and security 
sector is one of the most important projects to enhance democratization in central and Eastern Europe.  
2 Linz and Stepan used the term, sultanistic, as a regime type for analyzing democratic transition and 
consolidation. In their book, sultanism refers to “a generic style of domination and regime rulership 
that is an extreme form of patrimonialism.” (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 51-54)  




factors and circumstances determine the nature of civil-military relations by highlighting 
issues of military intervention in or disengagement from domestic politics and democratic 
civilian control of the military. 
Huntington, in his seminal work The Soldier and the State, attempts to resolve the 
contradictory relationship between civilian control of the military and military effectiveness 
by suggesting two main themes. These themes about which he writes are military 
professionalism and subjective versus objective civilian control. Military professionalism has 
three key characteristics such as expertise, responsibility, and corporateness that distinguish 
it from civilian professions. Subjective civilian control is the maximization of civilian power 
as opposed to objective civilian control, which distributes political power between military 
and civilian groups. The core element of objective civilian control is the recognition of 
autonomous military professionalism that creates voluntary subordination of the military to 
civilian leaders, whereas minimizing autonomous military professionalism is the essence of 
subjective civilian control. For Huntington, maximizing military professionalism and 
objective civilian control is the best way to keep a stable relationship between civilians and 
militaries. Acknowledging independent military professionalism by separating the military 
from the political arena is to consolidate civilian control of the military without hurting 
military effectiveness (Huntington, 1957). This Huntingtonian approach has been recognized 
as the standard principle in civil-military relations for several decades. 
In the Huntingtonian tradition, scholars have made special efforts to find some conditions 
that affect the level and nature of the armed forces’ direct role in politics. In fact, it is 
difficult to precisely define military intervention in and disengagement from politics. For this 
reason, Welch (1987) points out four problems in deciding the nature, scope, analysis, and 
causality of military disengagement from politics by stressing the aspect of military interest 
in determining military intervention and disengagement. Some scholars have suggested 
examining levels of military participation in politics. Finer (1967: 86-139) notes that military 
intervention in politics consists of “the armed forces’ constrained substitution of their own 
policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities” and then lays 
out four levels of military intervention in politics (influence, pressures or blackmail, 
displacement, and supplantment) in accordance with four levels of political culture (mature, 
developed, low, and minimal political cultures). The level of influence contends that the 
military can influence politics in terms of the constitutional and legitimate bases. This level 
can be founded in the mature political culture in which the legitimacy for political power is 
paramount and unobtainable by military. Therefore, the military’s intervention in politics is 
considered as a “wholly unwarrantable intrusion.” In the level of pressure or blackmail, 
military power is exercised through implied verbal or real threat. These levels can be found 
in the developed political culture where the legitimacy of political power is important but it 
is in dispute. The third level, displacement, includes actions such as substitution of a cabinet 
or ruler by direct action of the armed forces; national leaders are in effect puppets or 
projection of military leaders. The last level, supplantment, is the most comprehensive level 
of military intervention in politics. In this case, the military not only builds government in its 
favor but also constitutes the government, either on its own or more likely with allies. The 
author argues that these two types of military intervention normally occur in the low or 
minimal political culture. 
Through the three factors such as motive, mood, and opportunity disposing the military to 
intervene in politics, Finer also argues that the soldiers’ belief in being the “saviours of their 
countries,” serving the “national interest,” and their particular “sectional interests” (such as 
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class, regional, corporate, or individual interests) motivate soldiers to intervene in politics. 
When the armed forces are popular, they are more likely to become involved in politics, 
particularly in the case of domestic crisis. By contrast, he identifies that professionalism, the 
armed forces’ acceptance of the principle of civilian supremacy, and the military’s fears of a 
civil war or of punishment may inhibit the military’s desire to intervene in domestic politics 
(Finer, 1967: 23-60). 
Nordlinger (1977) makes an effort to build a typology of praetorianism. According to him, 
praetorians can be classified into three types, such as moderators, guardians, and rulers. His 
distinction is contingent on two dimensions: (1) To what extent praetorian group has 
governmental power; (2) The praetorian officers’ political and economic objectives (i.e. 
seeking status quo or correction/change). The intensity of military intervention in politics is 
minimal in the moderator type and maximal in the ruler type. 
These analyses mainly rest on intramilitary and domestic factors. Welch (1992: 323-342) 
points out the importance of integrated analysis regarding military involvement in politics 
and lists both obstacles and incentives to long-term military disengagement from politics. He 
asserts that there is no Kuhnian paradigm or Lakatosian research program for the study of 
military disengagement from politics; this is due to the general lack of consensus on causes 
and consequences of military intervention and disengagement. 
Scholars in the field have recently begun to reconsider Huntington’s classical thesis and 
have attempted to produce new theoretical frameworks to explore civil-military relations. 
Feaver (1996: 167-170) criticizes both the underdevelopment of general civil-military 
relations theories and the Huntingtonian-oriented analysis by contending that it is time for 
the field to transcend the concept of professionalization to explain civilian control. He 
develops “a principal-agent theory” in which a game of strategic interaction between civilian 
leaders and military agents takes place based on their own preferences for outcomes. This 
theory views that contractual incentives using various oversight mechanisms and 
punishments are the centerpiece of civilian control of the military (Feaver, 2003).  
Schiff’s study introduces “a theory of concordance” that challenges the Huntingtonian 
general consensus about the separation of the military from politics maximizing military 
professionalism by proposing “the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry as 
partners.” She further predicts that “when they agree about the role of the armed forces by 
achieving a mutual accommodation, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur in a 
particular state.” Her main contribution to the study of civil-military relations is the attempt 
to overcome the American standard of analysis using military professionalism and the role of 
institution through considering the significant effect of political culture. However, her study 
has been criticized for its lack of clarity concerned with measuring independent and 
dependent variables (Schiff, 1995: 7-18; Wells, 1996: 269-275; Schiff, 1996: 277-283). 
Bland also presents “a theory of shared responsibility.” The interrelationship between 
civilians and the military and its impact on civilian control of the military are the focus of his 
theory. This theory contends that “civil control of the military is managed and maintained 
through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military leaders 
and the relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally 
evolved regime of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which 
actor expectations converge.” In particular, civilian leaders are responsible for macro policies 
that determine overall national objectives, defense resources, and the use of force, while 
military leaders have “vested authority” over micro policies such as military doctrine, 
training, operations, organization that are confined to military subjects only (Bland, 1999: 7-




26; 2001: 525-540). This theory is noticeable in terms of its universal explanation which 
accounts for all types of regime type and interactions between core players. 
Desch suggests a structural model for relationship between intensity of internal and 
external threat and civil-military relation. His basic assumption lies in the notion: “the 
structural threat environment should affect the character of the civilian leadership, the nature 
of the military institution, the cohesiveness of state institutions, the method of civilian 
control, and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas and cultures.” He 
argues that a high external threat and low internal threat may best insure civilian supremacy 
over the military, while a low external threat and a high internal threat may result in poor 
civilian control of the military. He claims, “externally oriented military doctrines are 
necessary conditions for civilian control of the military” (Desch, 1998: 389-405; 1999: 13). 
Overall, the field of civil-military relations has been suffering from the lack of widely 
accepted general theory and the key research topic has still revolved around the question of 
civilian control focusing on the universal applicability of military professionalism, set forth 
by Huntington 57 years ago. To Huntingtonian-oriented researchers, institutional civilian 
control via preservation for independent military and autonomous military professionalism is 
the key in civil-military relations. This Huntington’s objective control model has provided a 
solid theoretical basis to the issue of civilian control in terms of two aspects. First, 
Huntington rightly points out that politicization of the military is harmful to military 
effectiveness and professionalism. Second, objective control of the military allows the 
military to have a considerable autonomy and expertise. However, Huntington fails to 
recognize that a clear separation between political and military affairs is neither possible nor 
desirable. This is because best choices of defense and national security policy require close 
interaction between civilian and military leaders. Strategically effective choice is possible 
when civilian elites and military leaders play a complementary role that creates a synergy 
effect (Nielsen and Snider, 2009: 290-293). 
Under the increased convergence of military and civilian institutions and the greater 
integration of the military and the civilian sectors of society, the integration rather than 
separation of civil and military sectors is a key task for democratic civilian control of the 
military (Janowitz, 1960, 7-16; Feaver, 1996: 158-167; Burk, 1993: 167-185). This does not 
necessarily mean that civilian leaders and military leaders have an equal authority. It means 
both civilian leaders and military leaders are equal partners in dealing with defense and 
security issues, but authority should be bestowed upon civilian leaders. A norm of “equal 
dialogue, unequal authority” (Nielsen and Snider, 2009: 293) will be good for both the 
democratic civilian control of the military and the military’s effectiveness. So, civilian 
supremacy and an active civilian supervision of military affairs should be institutionalized to 
enhance democratic civilian control of the military. Democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces must begin with two fundamental principles, such as civilian supremacy and 
parliamentary control.
3
 Consequently, democratic civilian control of the military is best 
achieved when the two principles are firmly institutionalized. 
Civilian supremacy is achieved through civilian control of the military. Civilian control 
of the military is possible by civilianization of the armed forces. However, the mere 
                                                          
3  Born distinguishes the conceptual difference between the narrow scope and the broad scope of 
democratic control. According to the author, “the narrow scope of the democratic control focuses on 
civilian supremacy and parliamentary control. The broad scope focuses on integrating the military into 
society.” This research follows the narrow scope of democratic control (Born, 2003: 151-165). 
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civilianization of the armed forces does not necessarily lead to democratic civilian control of 
the military. Only through installing solid civilian leadership within the military’s key 
decision-making posts, the meaningful democratic civilian control of the armed forces could 
be established. In this sense, it is necessary to look at the background of the MND’s high-
ranking officials and decision-making structure in order to assess the degree of civilian 
control of the military.  
Few would deny that civilianization of the MND leadership is a pre-requisite for 
democratic civilian control of the military. However, it does not necessarily lead to the full 
democratic civilian control of the military. Parliamentary control of the military must be 
established to complete the fundamental necessary requirements for overall democratic civil-
military relations. When a parliament has a legal authority and a substantial legitimacy to 
exercise its oversight over the military, it is able to fulfill a key role in democratic civil-
military relations. The issue of the lack of oversight of the military by the National Assembly 
has been pointed out as one remaining task for consolidating democratic civil-military 
relations in South Korea (Saxer, 2004: 403). Why this is so? Is it really like that or is it just a 
statement full of exaggeration? The next section will evaluate the actual state of 
parliamentary control of the armed forces. 
 
 
3. CRAFTING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
 
3.1 Leadership Composition in the MND 
 
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is a key institution and the highest authority in 
the military’s decision-making. The role of this institution in improving democratic control 
of the military is important; however, little attention is paid to this institution. Establishing 
democratic civilian control of the MND, therefore, would foster democratic consolidation. In 
this part, this study analyzes the degree of democratic civilian control of the MND in South 
Korea by examining the civilianization of the MND leadership and key staffs.  
South Korea established the defense headquarters in 1945 under the U.S. military 
leadership after the independence from Japan’s colonial rule and it became the Ministry of 
National Defense in 1948. Since then, the MND, as a core bureaucratic institution, has 
played a significant role in South Korean national defense. The MND is still very influential 
to Korean society and government. According to a study, the MND is ranked 3
rd
 most 
powerful bureaucracy out of forty-five central agencies in the South Korean government (Oh, 
2006). Who leads this powerful institution? The MND organization structure is very 
hierarchical and has a top-down process of decision-making. Minister of national defense 
and vice minister of national defense are two key officials who have the authority to 
determine major issues related to defense and security sectors and they are staffed with five 
offices, eighteen bureaus, and seventy departments. 
The two top officials, minister and vice minister of national defense, have full 
responsibilities not only to lead the armed forces but also to bridge the gap between 
politicians and government and military leaders as representatives of the military. 
Democratically consolidated countries in most Western European countries and the United 
States have traditionally appointed civilians to those positions assuming that “it clearly is 
positive for the democracy, since it potentially removes an obstacle to democratic 
legitimacy” (Bruneau and Goetze, 2006: 79). In theory, South Korea has civilian minister   




Table 1. Defense Minister and Vice Minister in South Korea (1948-2014) 
Classification 













Retired Army Gen. 
Retired Navy Adm. 






























Total 25 19 44(100%) 23 17 40 84(100%) 
Source: The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea at http://www.mnd.go.kr. 
 
 
and vice minister of national defense; in practice, it is hard to say that they are real civilians 
because most of them are appointed to the positions after their recent relief from active duty. 
For example, one of the former defense ministers took his office within one month after his 
retirement as the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Simply put, many defense 
ministers and vice defense ministers just changed their uniforms from military to civilian 
suits. They are a kind of ‘quasi-civilians’ who migrate from being a soldier to becoming a 
civilian. In the case of the United States, their law does not allow retired military persons to 
be appointed to Secretary of Defense within ten years and to Secretary of the Army, the 
Navy, and the Air Force within five years after retirement from active duty.
4
 This is not the 
case for South Korea. Table 1 shows the professional backgrounds of former defense 
ministers and vice ministers in South Korea. 
This data apparently demonstrates the low degree of civilian supremacy in the top 
leadership of the MND. Retired military high-ranking officers took 86.4 percent of defense 
ministers and 60 percent of vice defense ministers and noticeably majority of them (64.3 
percent) were army generals. In particular, no a true civilian has been appointed to the 
minister of national defense since 1989, when democratic transition and consolidation 
occurred in South Korea.
5
 Only six civilians took in charge of vice minister of national 
defense after the Kim Young-Sam government, including the current vice minister of 
national defense in the Park Geun-Hye government. In fact, the Roh Moo-Hyun government 
was asked by civilian societies to make a special effort to nominate a civilian defense 
minister; however, it turned out to be a very difficult political task. President Roh decided to 
postpone the civilianization of a defense minister (Ryu, 2004; Hankyoreh, 2006). As a result, 





defense ministers of South Korea in succession after their retirements from the military. This 
evidence seems running counter to the trend in democratically consolidating countries. For 
instance, several Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Uruguay have filled civilian women to the posts of defense ministers. 
The overall civilianization of the MND staff is also far behind the average level of 
advanced democracies. In 2004, the percentage of civilianization of the total MND staff was 
                                                          
4 The United States Code Title 10. Armed Forces, available at http://uscode.house.gov. 
5 The last civilian defense minister in the history of the South Korean military was Hyun Suk-Ho (the 
11th defense minister: 1961. 1~1961. 5). 
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52 percent and only seven out of sixteen directors of bureau were civilians. Taken this fact 
seriously, the Roh Moo-Hyun government forced the military to set out a plan called 
“defense reform 2020” to expand a civilian-led system in the MND and in defense 
management. According to this plan, the MND was scheduled to increase civilian staff up to 
71 percent (518 civilians out of total 725 MND staff) by 2009. This plan was a good 
precursor for improving civilianization and democratic civilian control of the military and 
the MND. As of 2010, 65 percent of the total MND staff was civilians. The MND makes a 
good progress in civilianization of the MND; however, it seems that the MND has some 
hesitation to civilianize its key staff. As Table 2 shows, the percentage of civilians in the 
decision-making positions of the MND(above director level) was only forty-nine percent(46 
persons out of 93 persons). This percentage of civilians in the key MND staff is very low 
compared to other democratic countries like the United States. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) has maintained 85 percent of civilians in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) level.
6
  
Why is this asymmetric proportion of the MND leadership and staffs between civilians 
and military officers happening in South Korea? What would be the best explanation for this 
situation? I believe that this is due largely to the ongoing high security threat in the Korean 
peninsula. The external threat environment may keep the military busy in their basic mission; 
however, it may not always be associated with strong democratic civilian control of the 
military. Faced with the North Korean threat, the military is not ready to accept true civilians 
as its top leaders on the premise that civilians may not be able to perform the significant roles 
of minister and vice minister effectively because they do not have the full experience and 
professional knowledge about the military. Arguably, the effectiveness is the single most 
important element for the South Korean armed forces in order to compete against the North 
Korean military. The top leaders of the MND must not master political skills but professional 
knowledge on force structure, use of force, allocation of resource, and so on. Therefore, it is 
difficult to deny that the North Korean threat and the lack of civilian experts in defense 
sectors may give a solid justification for the military to keep its autonomy in determining the 
MND leadership.  
 
 
Table 2. Civilianization of the MND of the ROK 
MND Staff Civilian Active Duty Retired Officer Total 
Head of Office 
Director of Bureau 










5 (100 %) 
18 (100 %) 
70 (100%) 
Total 46 (49%) 38 (41%) 9 (10%) 93 (100%) 




                                                          
6 OSD refers to Office of the Secretary of Defense in U.S. DoD that is “the principal staff element of 
the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resource management, and 
program evaluation” (The U.S. DoD, 2010: 13). 





3.2 Parliamentary Control of the MND 
 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea plays a critical role in enhancing 
democratic civilian control of the military. Due to the problems of participation and expertise 
like in other democratic countries, the National Assembly established a special committee, 
called the National Defense Committee (NDC), in 1948. The NDC is a core institution 
designed to take charge of defense and security issues within the National Assembly. The 
NDC has three major legislative powers: (1) power to deliberate and settle defense budget 
bills; (2) power to enact and amend law related defense and security policies; (3) power to 
inspect and investigate the armed forces. Besides, the NDC influence exercising powers to 
control approval of high-ranking military officers (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
only) and the use of forces that those have been considered as main powers of parliament 
over the military in consolidated democratic countries. Despite its significant role of the 
NDC with respect to democratic civilian control of the military, no special attention has been 
paid to this committee (Giraldo, 2006: 34-70). 
The impact of the NDC’s involvement in the defense and security sectors is significant; 
democratic and effective operation of the NDC would be able to boost democratic civil-
military relations. One of the major powers of the NDC is to deliberate and approve the 
defense budget that is of vital interest to the military. Needless to say, the military leaders 
want to obtain and keep large defense budgets, while civilian leaders try to cut it down as 
much as they can. Both the military and civilian leaders are struggling to influence the 
decision-making process of the defense budget. The NDC stands at the very point of conflict 
between the two groups. The NDC is involved in the budgetary process by reviewing and 
approving the budget bill. Although the final decision of the defense budget is entirely up to 
the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts in the National Assembly, there is not much 
difference between the approved budget bill of the NDC and that of the Special Committee. 
There has been a noticeable reduction of South Korean defense expenditures in the process 
of democratic transition and consolidation. For example, the average percentage of defense 
expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was reduced from 3.78 percent 
under the Roh Tae-Woo government (1988-1992) to 2.59 percent under the Lee Myung-Bak 
government (2008-2012).
7
 This continuous reduction in defense expenditure implies the 
dilution of the military’s prerogatives and political power. This situation has augmented the 
influence of the NDC on the military, because the politically weakened armed forces should 
make an effort to persuade and lobby the NDC in order to increase or not to decrease defense 
budget.  
The NDC also has power to inspect the military on an annual basis. All major military 
organizations, including the MND, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and four military 
headquarters (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and all fields of the military, such 
as budget, manpower, operation, logistics, and intelligence are subjected to inspection. The 
main purpose of this annual inspection is to check whether the military has effective 
management, combat readiness, transparency, and accountability. The evaluation outcome of 
the inspection critically affects the future status of organizations as well as that of 
                                                          
7 Stokholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4. The average percentage of defense budget as a percentage of 
GDP between 2013 and 2014 is 2.57 percent in the current Park Geun-Hye government.  
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individuals; it is a big issue for military leaders to get good results in the inspection. In 
addition, the NDC has power to discharge the defense minister from office. When the NDC 
finds a defense minister’s wrongdoing like corruption and inability to keep his role, the 
committee can call an official meeting and request the minister to attend the meeting and 
answer questions. If the NDC determines the minister’s misbehavior is seriously harmful for 
securing defense and security, then the committee passes a recommendation for the removal 
of the defense minister from office. All of these activities of the NDC are firmly 
institutionalized in the South Korean constitution and statutory.  
Based on these observations, it is easy to realize the strong power of the NDC and its 
impact on the military. We can postulate that if the decision-making process of the NDC is 
influenced by the military rather than the other way around, it will be closely associated with 
the low level of democratic civilian control of the military. One way of pinpointing the 
relationship between the NDC and the military is to look at the component of the committee. 
If the NDC is comprised of members who have individual undue favors to the military, 
outcomes of the committee would be resulted in something good for the armed forces. No 
doubt, former military high ranking officers may try to secure interests of the armed forces 
through dominating decision-making process of the NDC. This argument raises a hypothesis 
that as the degree of democratic civilian control of the military increases, the number of 
retired military officers in the NDC will be decreased and vice versa. This is because 
established democracies do not allow the military to play major role in domestic politics and 
in the NDC as well, whereas the armed forces may effectively influence those areas under 
authoritarian military government and young democracies. The hypothesis is supported by 
evidences in South Korea.  
The average percentage of retired military high ranking officers in the NDC has been 
declined from 35 percent during the Roh Tae-Woo government to 13 percent during the Roh 
Moo-Hyun government.
8
 During the Roh Tae-Woo government, the political influence of the 
military was still powerful to the government and to the NDC which meant it did not need to 
take care of the NDC because the institution was under the influence of the military. This 
was not the case for civilian government. As democratic consolidation deepens in South 
Korea, retired military officers could not play a major role in the NDC any longer. As a 
result, the percentage of retired military high ranking officers in the National Assembly and 
in the NDC together has dwindled. This evidence clearly shows the strengthened democratic 






Democratization in South Korea changed the role of the military in politics and society. 
In effect, the political influence and the leading role of the military in society have been 
significantly diminished. The military no longer appeared to involve in domestic politics. As 
it turned out, the efforts of the prevention of military’s re-intervention in politics were 
successful (Croissant and Kuehn, 2009: 187-218); the attempts of reforming some areas of 
                                                          
8 The Republic of Korea National Defense Committee, available at http://defense.na.go.kr; Republic of 
Korea National Assembly, available at http://www.assembly.go.kr; DongA people search, available at 
http://www.donga.com/inmul/inmul_search.html. 




the army remain somewhat intact. Civilian leadership has firmly institutionalized 
parliamentary control of the military by increasing parliamentary power over the military. By 
contrast, the democratic force had less success in establishing civilian supremacy in the top 
leadership of the military. This was due mainly to the tangible threat from the North. Under 
the volatile and continuous North Korean threat and intertwined inter-Korean relations, 
South Korean armed forces have been required to maintain its effectiveness and thus have 
maintained its autonomy in the areas of defense and security. 
The military’s autonomy from civilian control and maintenance of the military’s efficacy 
are major interests for military leaders. Specifically, the military elite strongly want to keep 
their autonomy in the field of defense and security in which their fundamental interest exists. 
Even though the military pass many privileges over to the democratic force, the decision-
making positions of defense and security sector is the last area that they would like to yield. 
Accordingly, the improvement of civil control of the top leadership of defense and security 
field is generally slower than that of other areas. In this sense, it is clearly expected to see 
that the South Korean military will strive to keep its institutional autonomy in those fields as 
much as it could.
9
  The ongoing high national security threat will help the armed forces to 
justify and retain its institutional autonomy in the process of democratic consolidation. In the 
eye of the democratic elite, on the other hand, the national security problem could be a 
difficult issue for them to handle for democratic progress. This does not necessarily mean 
that the national security problem cannot be compatible with democratization. It does mean 
that the nature of national security issues are too complex to unravel and thus should be 
carefully managed by the democratic group (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 19). Otherwise, the 
national security problem makes the road to democratic consolidation more difficult.  
Due to the constant skirmishes between the two Koreas, it appears that further democratic 
civilian control of the military may not be plausible in near future. In spite of this difficulty, 
it is the foremost task of civilian leaders to civilianize the top leadership and key staffs of the 
MND for democratic consolidation. The skewed balance of manpower distribution between 
the active duty and the civilian within the MND poses a problem in an era of integration and 
convergence. Additionally, the top leadership of the military is required to demonstrate 
political skills which would empower them to bring a greater defense budget and support for 
defense policy (Kim, 2010: 126). The retired high-ranking army officers-led MND 
leadership needs be changed to a true civilian-led leadership. For facilitating this task, the 
political leadership needs to legalize the appointment time for retired military generals to the 
posts of the MND leadership because they should spend some time to acclimate themselves 
to a new civil society and to think like civilians. Civilianizing the key staffs of the MND is 
also one of the most important areas for further development in democratic civil-military 
relations in South Korea. However, having civilian defense ministers, vice ministers, or key 
staffs will not automatically ensure the improvement of democratic civilian control of the 
military. A civilian defense minister, a vice defense minister, and a key staff who have the 
capabilities to run the MND efficiently without undermining military’s effectiveness and 
readiness can only be accepted by the military and it ultimately improve democratic civil-
military relations in South Korea.  
                                                          
9 Although the terms military and institutional autonomy have not clear meanings, one study provides 
clarity in these concepts by defining military autonomy as “an institution’s decision-making 
authority,” and institutional autonomy as “the military’s professional independence and exclusivity” 
(Pion-Berlin, 1992: 84). 
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